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Examining the Relationship of Organizational Insiders’ Psychological Capital with Information 
Security Threat and Coping Appraisals 
 
ABSTRACT 
Practitioners and researchers alike recognize the positive influence insiders’ behavior can have on 
information systems (IS) security. This awareness has resulted in a research stream focused on the 
performance of protective behaviors. We contribute to this research stream by extending an oft-cited 
theory in the information security literature—protection motivation theory (PMT)—to include the 
relationship of insiders’ psychological capital (PsyCap) with the mechanisms of PMT.  
PsyCap is a construct of role-breadth psychological capacities and resources embodying important work-
related motivational resources. Therefore, given the varied facets central to PMT, determining the 
relationship of PsyCap with each distinct PMT mechanism is an important contribution. Furthermore, 
prior research has established that individuals can develop their PsyCap. Consequently, considering the 
relationship of role-breadth PsyCap with the PMT mechanisms provides an important and malleable, 
motivational antecedent that complements PMT and is absent from most assessments of the contemporary 
PMT model. We find support for PsyCap’s relationship with the mechanisms of PMT and suggest 
opportunities to develop PsyCap in conjunction with other organizational security efforts. We present our 
findings, discuss their implications for research and practice, and highlight several opportunities for future 
research.  
Keywords 
Information security, psychological capital (PsyCap), protection motivation theory (PMT), positive 
psychology, organizational insiders
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1. Introduction  
Information systems (IS) protection is a primary focus of many organizations due to their increased 
reliance on IS for their success (Crossler et al., 2013; Hsu et al., 2015). The need for technical security 
measures has been well established and documented in the literature (Zafar & Clark, 2009); however, an 
evolving view holds that effective information security requires a behavioral, as well as a technical, 
component (AlHogail, 2015; Boss et al., 2015; Hsu et al., 2015; Posey et al., 2013; Stanton et al., 2006; 
Vance et al., 2015). Behavioral considerations in IS security have been exacerbated by the need to 
provide employees with access to organizational IS throughout the organization via enterprise-wide 
systems from home and on mobile devices (Cisco, 2013; Vance et al., 2015). This complex security 
environment blunts the effectiveness of a centralized response from organizational information 
technology (IT) personnel because the devices and users are often far beyond the proximate control of the 
IT security staff, and some wide-access systems can never be fully locked down without causing 
organizational inefficiencies (Vance et al., 2015).  
Therefore, many researchers in information security now recognize that an organization’s 
information security depends increasingly on the security efforts of organizational insiders who have 
access to the firm’s IS (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Hsu et al., 2015; Vance et al., 2015). These insiders are 
full-time and part-time employees, as well as authorized agents of the firm, with access to the 
organization’s information assets (Moore et al., 2012; Posey et al., 2013). This evolving influence of the 
insider has led to the emergence of behavioral information security (Crossler et al., 2013), which is the 
study of “the human actions that influence the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of information 
systems” (Stanton et al., 2006, p. 263). Unfortunately, identifying the motivators of these important 
behaviors has proved to be somewhat elusive, resulting in what the discipline has dubbed a “knowing-
doing” gap between insiders’ abilities and behaviors (Workman et al., 2008).  
To address this divide separating insiders’ knowledge and abilities from security-related behaviors, 
we look to insights from the positive psychology movement to augment the field’s understanding of 
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insiders’ performance of protective behaviors. Positive psychology is a branch of psychology that 
considers the “optimal functioning of people, groups, and institutions” (Gable & Haidt, 2005, p. 104) and 
seeks to improve what is right rather than fix what is wrong in the average person (Sheldon & King, 
2001). Consequently, we assert that integrating positive psychology with current IS security approaches 
can improve their explanation of security-related outcomes, particularly those outcomes directly resulting 
from insiders’ behaviors. To demonstrate the role of positive psychology in IS security, we assess the 
motivational facets from the established motivational framework of protection motivation theory (PMT) 
(Floyd et al., 2000; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997) that are used extensively in information security (e.g., 
Boss et al., 2015; Posey et al., 2015a), in relation to a work-related core tenet of positive psychology, 
psychological capital (PsyCap) (Luthans et al., 2006b; Luthans et al., 2007b). 
PsyCap is a higher-order construct comprising the work-related, role-breadth tenets of positive 
psychology: hope, optimism, resilience, and self-efficacy (Luthans et al., 2006a; Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Role-breadth resources, such as PsyCap, are uniquely positioned for use in 
contemporary organizational IS security research because they relate to a broader set of tasks rather than 
an employee’s technical job requirements (Parker, 1998). Our integration of PsyCap with PMT is in line 
with the view of PMT’s founders that the consideration of positive outcomes increases the theory’s 
applicability without substantially modifying its core tenets (Maddux & Rogers, 1983). Accordingly, we 
assert that examining the relationship of PsyCap with the core appeals (i.e., threat and coping appraisals) 
suggested by PMT (Rogers, 1975; 1983) provides an important updated consideration of the prominent 
theory’s explanation of insiders’ performance of protective-based actions, such as protection-motivated 
behaviors (PMBs). PMBs are the volitional behaviors organizational insiders can enact to protect (1) 
organizationally relevant information within their firms and (2) the computer-based IS that stores, 
collects, disseminates, and/or manipulates that information in light of information security threats (Posey 
et al., 2013).  
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2. Background on Psychological Capital (PsyCap) 
As a higher-order construct, PsyCap comprises several distinct, yet related, core tenets of positive 
psychology: hope, resilience, optimism, and self-efficacy. Positive psychology focuses on optimal 
functioning or what is known as “flourishing” (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Positive psychology 
is an ideal complement to IS security research because its emphasis on the positive functioning of average 
people (Sheldon & King, 2001) makes it well-calibrated for investigations of information security-
enhancing behaviors of ordinary employees. Further, PsyCap introduces an important broad-based, work-
related positive psychological resource to the IS security literature, which is still grappling with a 
knowing-doing gap (Cox, 2012; Workman et al., 2008).  
Hope, the first of the four PsyCap subconstructs, is a “positive motivational state that is based on an 
interactively derived sense of successful (a) agency (goal-directed energy) and (b) pathways (planning to 
meet goals)” (Snyder et al., 1991, p. 287) . PsyCap resilience “is characterized by positive coping and 
adaptation in the face of significant risk or adversity” (Luthans et al., 2007a, p. 546). Resilience is also 
“the positive psychological capacity to rebound, to ‘bounce back’ from adversity, uncertainty, conflict, 
failure, or even positive change, progress and increased responsibility” (Luthans, 2002, p. 702). PsyCap 
optimism is the characteristic of individuals who “expect things to go their way, and generally believe that 
good rather than bad things will happen to them” (Scheier & Carver, 1985, p. 219). Finally, PsyCap self-
efficacy is a role-breadth characteristic and is defined as an “employee’s perceived capability of carrying 
out a broader and more proactive set of work tasks that extend beyond prescribed technical requirements” 
(Parker, 1998, p. 835).  
Although a relatively new construct, PsyCap has already been well accepted in the field of 
organizational behavior and other fields (Abbas et al., 2014; Avey et al., 2009; Peterson et al., 2011; 
Wang et al., 2012). A primary reason for this acceptance is that PsyCap’s characteristics are state-like 
rather than trait-like. Although research often relies on context to infer distinctions between states and 
traits (Allen & Potkay, 1981), important distinctions exist between them (Fugate et al., 2012; Zuckerman, 
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1983). As opposed to trait-like individual characteristics, which tend to be relatively stable and pervasive, 
state-like characteristics relate to specific contexts or tasks and may be subject to change over time (Chen 
et al., 2000). The key aspect of individual state-like characteristics is they can be changed and altered 
depending on the task, situation, and environment. This distinction is especially beneficial in an 
information security context because studies show individuals can develop PsyCap (Luthans et al., 2007a; 
Peterson et al., 2011). The ductile quality of PsyCap and its components distinguishes them from other 
more stable, trait-like personal characteristics, such as the “Big Five” personality facets (Goldberg, 1990) 
and the higher-order construct of core self-evaluation (Judge & Bono, 2001; Luthans et al., 2007a). 
Peterson (2012)  summarizes PsyCap’s state-like nature succinctly:  
People’s locus of control and self-esteem are things a manager probably can’t change 
significantly within a few weeks. Psychological capital is more malleable. We’re not born 
hopeful, resilient, optimistic, efficacious people. We learn these things. 
State-like malleability is a crucial aspect of PsyCap because it allows intervention in an individual’s 
course of action. Thus, the mechanisms for developing insiders’ PsyCap constitute a key aspect of its 
applicability for IS security. For example, PsyCap can be developed within the organization through 
targeted interventions (i.e., developed at the subconstruct level) (Luthans et al., 2006a; Luthans et al., 
2006b) or as a higher-order factor through broader means (e.g., supportive organizational climate) 
(Luthans et al., 2008b). Researchers who have conducted targeted intervention research efforts, termed 
PsyCap interventions, have enumerated successful strategies for developing PsyCap in the workplace 
(Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et al., 2008b). A thorough treatment of PsyCap “micro-intervention” 
appears in Luthans et al. (2007a). Table 1 summarizes possible PsyCap interventions. 
PsyCap is a higher-order reflective construct, which means that its subconstructs vary together in the 
same direction (Bagozzi, 2011; Jarvis et al., 2003). Building PsyCap at the subconstruct level leverages 
the synergistic relationship among the individual components to develop each subconstruct 
simultaneously (Luthans et al., 2007b). As the name implies, one can relate PsyCap to a factor of  
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Table 1. Micro-developments and PsyCap Interventionsi 
PsyCap 
Component 
Micro-developments  PsyCap Interventions Strategies 
Hope 1. Goal setting 
2. Participation  
3. Contingency planning for 
alternative pathways to attain 
goals 
1. Encourage employees to define personally valuable 
work-related goals.  
2. Empower goal ownership.  
3. Assist in obstacle prediction and develop 
contingency plans for achievement.  
Resilience 1. Asset-focused strategies, such 
as enhancing employability  
2. Risk-focused strategies, such as 
proactive avoidance of 
adversity 
3. Process-focused strategies to 
influence the interpretation of 
adverse events 
1. Train employees with transferable skills to enhance 
perception of work-related assets.  
2. Help identify roadblocks and avenues of avoidance.  
3. Coach employees to frame setbacks in terms of 
impact, control, and options to guard against 
feelings of helplessness and encourage ability to 
bounce back in the face of adversity.  
Optimism 1. Leniency for the past 
2. Appreciation for the present 
3. Identifying future opportunities 
1. Encourage problem-centered coping that 
acknowledges the sunk-cost of past failures.  
2. Characterize the present as an opportunity for 
success.  
3. Counteract pessimism through the development of 
realistic, yet optimistic, expectations. 
Self-Efficacy 1. Mastery experiences 
2. Modelling and vicarious 
learning  
3. Social persuasion  
4. Physiological and 
psychological arousal 
1. Enable “small successes” by breaking down 
overarching goals into achievable intermediate 
tasks.  
2. Develop training and mentorship programs that 
allow employees to observe success and learn from 
others’ failures.  
3. Provide positive feedback.  
4. Support employees’ well-being by minimizing 
unnecessary workplace stressors. 
i Adapted from descriptions by Luthans et al. (2006a); Luthans et al. (2008a); Luthans et al. (2007a).  
 
psychological production. Parallel with the traditional factors of economic production, such as land (or 
natural resources), labor, and capital (Beer, 1980; Huettner & Costanza, 1982), PsyCap meets the criteria 
of a psychological resource (Avey et al., 2009). A resource can be defined as “those entities that are 
either centrally valued in their own right (e.g., self-esteem, close attachments, health, and inner peace) or 
act as a means to obtain centrally valued ends (e.g., money, social support, and credit)” (Hobfoll, 2002, p. 
307). Therefore, an appropriate theoretical lens through which to view PsyCap is that of resource theory 
(Hobfoll, 1989, 2002; Luthans et al., 2007b). Hobfoll’s (1989) resource theory stipulates that individuals 
require resources to function and seek to gain available resources and, whenever possible, conserve them. 
Thus, the conservation of resources theory has two major foci: (1) resource attainment and creation and 
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(2) resource conservation. In terms of Hobfoll’s resource definition, PsyCap is adaptive because it not 
only embodies a positive psychological state, but it also serves meaningful ends as a psychological 
construct. For instance, previous research shows that PsyCap provides the requisite psychological 
capacity or resources for psychological well-being and positive functioning (Culbertson et al., 2010).  
Whether one views PsyCap as a psychological resource or simply as a psychological state, it is 
important to highlight the previously established links between PsyCap and organizational outcomes. For 
our purposes, it is also imperative to relate the established relationships of PsyCap to IS security and 
PMT. First, the existing body of PsyCap literature has uncovered a positive relationship between PsyCap 
and increases in positive organizational and personal outcomes, as well as decreases in negative 
organizational and personal outcomes. For example, studies show that PsyCap increases job performance 
and satisfaction (Luthans et al., 2007a), as well as organizational commitment and citizenship (Avey et 
al., 2011). These previous findings are important because a positive relationship between satisfaction and 
organizational citizenship behaviors (i.e., in- and extra-role behaviors that support the organization) exists 
(Bateman & Organ, 1983; Williams & Anderson, 1991). Conversely, studies show PsyCap reduces 
unfavorable outcomes, such as absenteeism (Avey et al., 2006), turnover and stress (Avey et al., 2009), 
and cynicism and deviance (Avey et al., 2011).  
Therefore, we expect that as a domain-specific set of in- and extra-role security behaviors, PMBs 
similarly relate positively with insiders’ PsyCap. In light of the established organizational and personal 
implications of employees’ PsyCap, we hypothesize that the incorporation of PsyCap with IS security 
efforts will result in a symbiotic relationship between positive organizational and security outcomes.  
3. Background on Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) 
Researchers have employed PMT to assist in understanding individuals’ protective intentions and 
behaviors in varied motivational settings (Floyd et al., 2000; Milne et al., 2000), including IS security 
research (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; LaRose et al., 
2008; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Pahnila et al., 2007; Woon et al., 2005; Workman et al., 2008). Most previous 
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PMT efforts in IS security research relied on partial nomologies and implementations of PMT, which 
oversight has been recently corrected by Boss et al. (2015) and Posey et al. (2015a). Previous IS security 
studies have used PMT to assess the motivation related to various security-related intentions and 
behaviors. For example, PMT has been applied to the protection of personal resources from information 
security threats by motivating behaviors related to the adoption of home wireless security systems (Woon 
et al., 2005), anti-spyware/anti-malware software on personal computers (Gurung et al., 2009; Lee & 
Larsen, 2009), and location-based services (Junglas et al., 2008).  
Researchers have also effectively tapped PMT to explore employees’ intentions to protect 
organizational resources by adopting virus-protection software at work (Lee & Kozar, 2008), performing 
basic computer-security operations at work (e.g., updating passwords, securely backing up important 
files, and updating virus-protection software) (Workman et al., 2008), and complying with organizational 
information security policies (Herath & Rao, 2009; Siponen et al., 2009; 2010). These studies explaining 
employees’ security-related intentions and behaviors build on previous research explaining PMT’s role in 
understanding organizational issues, such as institutional change (Welbourne & Felton, 1998), 
employees’ reactions to social problems within the organization (Tanner et al., 1989), and the protection 
of organizations from financial losses (Beck, 1984).  
For our research, we examine PMT components as motivating factors for insiders to engage in 
PMBs. As previously defined, PMBs are a general class of protective roles that can capture both in-role 
and extra-role behaviors, which are generalizable across positions and industries. As a global measure, 
PMBs represent all insiders’ behaviors that aim to protect the organization, irrespective of the formally 
specified security needs of individual firms. 
In its original conception as an appeal to fear, PMT consisted of three major considerations: “(a) the 
magnitude of noxiousness of a depicted event; (b) the probability of that event’s occurrence; and (c) the 
efficacy of a protective response” (Rogers, 1975, p. 93). PMT later evolved to include what others 
describe as efficacy expectations (i.e., Bandura, 1977), or simply the self-efficacy, of the motivated 
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individual (Maddux & Rogers, 1983). The original inclusion of self-efficacy framed PMT as a general 
motivation theory, or theory of attitude change, rather than as a theory relying solely on fear appeals for 
change (Maddux & Rogers, 1983). Whereas prior to the inclusion of self-efficacy, PMT had a primarily 
external focus, with the inclusion of self-efficacy, PMT now includes a component that is both positive 
and internal to the motivated actor. 
Consequently, to guide our work, we use the latest adaptations of PMT: a bifurcated approach 
consisting of a threat appraisal and a coping appraisal. The threat appraisal includes: (1) the perceived 
probability that a threat will be successful (i.e., threat vulnerability); (2) the perceived acuteness of a 
threat’s consequences (i.e., threat severity); and (3) the perceived benefits to not enacting a prescribed 
response to a threat (i.e., maladaptive rewards) (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987). 
Additionally, contemporary PMT studies position fear as a partial mediator between the two threat-
focused coping mechanisms (i.e., threat severity and threat vulnerability) and behavioral adaptation 
(Floyd et al., 2000; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). This conceptualization of fear has been employed by 
IS researchers as well (Boss et al., 2015; Posey et al., 2015a). In the context of fear appeals, we define 
fear as a high-arousal, negative emotion occurring in response to threatening, relevant stimuli (Witte, 
1992). Conversely, the coping appraisal includes: (1) the perceived effectiveness of the available response 
(i.e., response efficacy); (2) the perceived ability to enact the prescribed response (i.e., self-efficacy); and 
(3) the perceived costs to the individual, both in terms of expended resources and opportunity cost from 
enacting a prescribed response (i.e., response cost) (Rogers, 1983; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997).  
Despite the role of positive motivation resulting from PMT’s inclusion of self-efficacy, even the 
most up-to-date conceptualizations of the theory fail to include role-breadth resources which are 
applicable across the gamut of behaviors of a particular domain. This limitation is especially relevant in 
today’s technological organizations, which often call on insiders to enact one of a range of protective 
behaviors to protect the firm’s resources. For example, Posey et al. (2013) established the diverse 
behavioral set that comprises insiders’ potential for protecting organizations from information security 
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threats. Every insider has a portfolio of protective roles and associated behaviors with which they must 
engage to protect organizational information assets. In the information security context, these roles vary 
depending on the situation. This set of roles provides a wide range of possibilities; yet, attending to 
divergent demands requires the insider to employ significant role-breadth resources (Smith & Lewis, 
2011). Traditional PMT cannot address this role-breadth nature of emerging security roles, and it is 
currently unclear how positive resource capabilities, such as those comprising PsyCap, relate to the facets 
of PMT. Consequently, examining PsyCap’s relationship with the facets of PMT serves as an important 
calibration of PMT to account for a broadened set of roles in PMBs.  
Both in terms of PsyCap’s potential relationship with PMT and PMT’s role in motivating PMBs, the 
distinction between the coping appraisal and threat appraisal is important. Despite the potential for 
positive management of the threat that the coping appraisal provides, the prevailing perspective of PMT 
has been in line with its earliest conceptualization as an approach to motivation through a fear appeal. In 
fact, security conceptualizations have largely ignored positive coping, such as self-efficacy, and have 
focused on security motivation purely in terms of fear appeals, while excluding fear itself (e.g., Johnston 
& Warkentin, 2010). The results of studies incorporating a fear appeal have clearly shown that fear 
appeals offer explanations of an insider’s intention to perform security behaviors (Herath & Rao, 2009; 
Johnston & Warkentin, 2010); yet, the presence of a fear response has recently been challenged 
(Warkentin et al., 2016). Meta-analyses of PMT research have shown that across studies of PMT, the 
coping appraisal has been more effective than the threat appraisal in eliciting the desired response (Floyd 
et al., 2000; Milne et al., 2000). Furthermore, we expect PsyCap, as a role-breadth construct of positive 
resource capabilities, to positively relate to the efficacy-based facets of the coping appraisal (i.e., security 
self-efficacy and response efficacy), while negatively relating to other facets (e.g., reducing threat 
severity by virtue of its hopeful, optimistic, self-efficacious, and resilient qualities). We will discuss these 
relationships in more detail through the development of our hypotheses in the next section. 
As noted previously, several researchers have applied portions of PMT to this context because of the 
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theory’s natural application to IS security (e.g., Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Lee & 
Larsen, 2009; Liang & Xue, 2010). Building on these studies, which have made notable contributions to 
PMT and IS security research stream, we examine a PMT model that includes the role-breadth PsyCap as 
an antecedent. Based on the preceding discussion of PsyCap and PMT, we conclude that investigating the 
relationship of PsyCap with the components of PMT represents a unique opportunity to situate a 
traditional security approach within the emerging context of positive psychology. Figure 1 displays our 
conceptual model.  
 
Figure 1. Hypotheses for Research Model 
 
4. PsyCap and PMT Model Hypotheses 
As discussed, we expect several distinct mechanisms of PMT to relate to PMB enactment. However, 
researchers have yet to examine these facets of PMT in the context of role-breadth positive psychological 
resources such as those in PsyCap. Based on previously established relationships among PsyCap and 
related constructs, along with its theoretical underpinnings, there are compelling reasons to expect that 
PsyCap will be related to the mechanisms of PMT. In this section, we first develop hypotheses relating 
PsyCap to PMT’s mechanisms and then offer hypotheses relating PMT to protection motivation and, 
ultimately, PMBs. We begin by relating PsyCap to the threat appraisal of PMT.  
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4.1 PsyCap and Threat Appraisal 
When insiders are confronted with a threat, they make several assessments regarding its potential 
ramifications for their organization’s information security. Previous research supports PsyCap’s potential 
relationship with the threat appraisal perceptions through the relationship of PsyCap subconstructs with 
the respective perceptions invoked in the PMT mechanisms. For example, perceptions of threat 
vulnerability and threat severity relate similarly to the PsyCap subconstructs. First, hope in the security 
context reflects the perception that the organization can achieve its goals regardless of threats that can 
affect it. Optimism should also reduce the perception of organizational security vulnerability and severity 
through the expectation of good rather than bad outcomes. Resilience indicates insiders’ abilities to 
“bounce back” after a negative event and should reduce the perception of the impact of an organizational 
threat. In other words, resilience characterizes the perception that the organization is able to overcome the 
threat and, if affected, recover and return to normalcy. Finally, role-breadth self-efficacy details insiders’ 
confidence in their abilities to handle the full breadth of their particular organizational role, including 
security behaviors and the reaction to negative events and potential organizational threats. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that PsyCap is negatively related to threat-focused assessments of threat vulnerability and 
severity.  
H1a: Insiders’ PsyCap is negatively related to their perceptions of threat vulnerability.  
H1b: Insiders’ PsyCap is negatively related to their perceptions of threat severity.  
Rounding out the threat appraisal process is the perception of maladaptive rewards. As we noted 
previously, these rewards are perceived benefits an insider may gain from failing to adapt behavior in the 
intended (i.e., “adaptive” or “protective”) manner (Rogers, 1983; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). 
PsyCap has been shown to relate to individual behaviors that are inconsistent with maladaptation. For 
example, researchers have established relationships between PsyCap and positive organizational 
behaviors, such as job performance (Luthans et al., 2007a), citizenship behaviors, and low deviance and 
counterproductive work behaviors (Avey et al., 2011). Given PsyCap’s negative relationship with 
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counterproductive work behaviors, such as maladaptation, we hypothesize that PsyCap is also negatively 
related to maladaptive rewards perceptions, such as illicit or unsanctioned remuneration, for failing to 
enact PMBs. 
H1c: Insiders’ PsyCap is negatively related to their perceptions of maladaptive rewards.  
4.2 PsyCap and Coping Appraisal 
In addition to threat appraisal mechanisms, insiders also engage in a complementary coping appraisal 
process. Drawing on previously established relationships among PsyCap subconstructs and insiders’ 
perceptions that make up the coping appraisal, we expect PsyCap to relate to the coping appraisal 
mechanisms. For example, response cost is the insiders’ perceived cost (e.g., inconvenience or 
opportunity cost) of security behavioral adaptations. The established relationships between PsyCap and 
positive organizational behaviors, such as increased organizational citizenship, imply a reduced perceived 
response cost in adapting behavior to protect the organization. In other words, an insider with higher 
PsyCap should calculate fewer response costs than one with low PsyCap. Thus, we hypothesize a 
negative relationship between PsyCap and security response cost.  
H1d: Insiders’ PsyCap is negatively related to their perceptions of response costs associated with 
protecting the organization by means of PMBs.  
Further, the two remaining mechanisms of the coping appraisal, self-efficacy and response efficacy, 
also relate to the subconstructs of PsyCap. As we have noted, in our context, self-efficacy is insiders’ 
confidence in their abilities to take precautions against a security threat, whereas response efficacy is 
insiders’ confidence that precautions they take are effective in protecting their firm’s information security. 
As a role-breadth resource of positive psychological capabilities, PsyCap is likely to have a unique 
relationship with these efficacy-based components of PMT. For example, through its relationship on 
positive expectations (Scheier & Carver, 1985), optimism should build confidence in successful 
behavioral adaptation (i.e., self-efficacy) and behavioral outcomes (i.e., response efficacy). Similarly, 
resilience builds self- and response efficacy by buffering the demoralizing effect of past loss and/or 
15 
 
failure, enabling insiders to bounce back from adversity (Luthans, 2002). Further, as we defined 
previously, role-breadth efficacy is insiders’ confidence in performing a broader set of work tasks (often 
required in the workplace) beyond the technical requirements of their specific job roles (Parker, 1998). 
Hence, in the context of information security, PsyCap’s work-related, role-breadth efficacy should relate 
positively to the narrower security-related self-efficacy because it pertains to the broad set of security 
roles insiders assume in fulfilling organizational duties. Finally, hope also includes both agency and 
pathways for meeting goals (Snyder et al., 1991; Snyder et al., 1996) and should relate directly to 
perceptions of both self- and response efficacy of protective behaviors. 
H1e: Insiders’ PsyCap is positively related to their perceptions of security self-efficacy. 
H1f: Insiders’ PsyCap is positively related to their perceptions of response efficacy.  
4.3 PMT Model Hypotheses 
The influence of fear appeals on motivation has been widely studied (Witte & Allen, 2000). 
Although the results have been somewhat equivocal (Peters et al., 2013), the prevailing view is that fear 
appeals often engage a cognitive processing model (e.g., Leventhal, 1970; Witte, 1992). These process 
models posit that in response to fear-inducing stimuli, individuals process their reactions largely in one of 
two ways (or in both ways simultaneously, with the stronger of the two ultimately guiding the response). 
The two processes are “danger control” and “fear control” (Nabi et al., 2008; Witte, 1994).  
The danger control process shares features with the primary cognitive appraisal process described in 
theories of stress and coping (i.e., Folkman et al., 1986). The primary cognitive appraisal in which 
individuals engage when confronted with a stressful situation is essentially an appraisal of threat 
vulnerability, and the motivation to consider the threat further hinges on their perception of existential 
vulnerability (Folkman et al., 1986). PMT predicts that individuals who focus primarily on controlling 
danger are more motivated to deal with the cause of the danger, ceteris paribus; that is, a given threat is 
seen as relevant to a person and generates fear that acts as a motivator, not a de-motivator, because of the 
complementary positive coping response. Thus, as Figure 1 depicts, the perception of threat vulnerability 
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and threat severity increases insiders’ protection motivation and fear responses in relation to 
organizational security threats. 
H2: Insiders’ perceptions of threat vulnerability are positively related to fear.  
H3: Insiders’ perceptions of threat severity are positively related to fear.  
H4: Insiders’ perceptions of threat vulnerability are positively related to their protection 
motivation. 
H5: Insiders’ perceptions of threat severity are positively related to their protection motivation.  
PMT includes the recognition that not every response to organizational threats is adaptive. This may 
result from insiders’ beliefs that the organization is impervious, the threat is not credible, or the personal 
benefit of failing to adapt outweighs that of adaptation (termed maladaptive response). We model the 
potential benefit received for failure to enact an adaptive, protective response as maladaptive rewards in 
Figure 1. These rewards may be intrinsic or extrinsic (Deci, 1972). “Fear control” is an example of a 
process in which insiders seek a maladaptive reward because they seek the reward of having their fear 
assuaged without addressing the threat itself. Again, this process involves the classic maladaptive 
responses researchers have described as avoidance, denial, and reactance (Witte & Allen, 2000), in which 
negative responses can negatively undermine organizational security compliance and behaviors (Lowry & 
Moody, 2015; Lowry et al., 2015).  
A related form of maladaptive behavior occurs when participants use neutralization techniques (e.g., 
denial) to rationalize their inappropriate security behaviors (Siponen & Vance, 2010). Maladaptive 
rewards are internal mechanisms for behavioral justification, but they may also arise externally (i.e., 
extrinsic rewards). An example of an extrinsic reward is the promise (and/or receipt) of monetary 
compensation or other enrichment for failing to make an adaptive response. In the context of a security 
study, one can easily conceive that nefarious actors may be willing to pay an insider for failing to protect 
the system or even for proactively rendering the system more vulnerable (e.g., sharing login information 
or selling valuable information).  
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H6: Insiders’ perceptions of maladaptive rewards are negatively related to their protection 
motivation.  
Fear appeals research is predicated on the assumption that a conditioned fear response can elicit a 
positively adaptive behavior (Boss et al., 2015; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010); therefore, in line with 
previous research, we also include fear’s positive relationship with protection motivation (Floyd et al., 
2000; Milne et al., 2000). 
H7: Fear generated from insiders’ perceptions of organizational security threats is positively 
related to their protection motivation.  
PMT also recognizes the influence of the cost of performing the motivated behavior, including the 
opportunity cost (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987). Response cost “may include expense, inconvenience, 
difficulty, and the side effects of the recommended response or of the actions associated with making that 
response” (Fruin et al., 1992, p. 57). The higher the perceived cost, the less motivated an individual is to 
perform the desired behavior.  
H8: Insiders’ perceptions of the response cost associated with protective behaviors is negatively 
related to their protection motivation.  
As we mentioned, PMT’s coping appraisal includes individuals’ beliefs that they are able to enact a 
prescribed response (e.g., security self-efficacy). The influence of self-efficacy on security-related 
motivation stems from Bandura’s work and is supported in previous PMT-based studies as well as other 
motivational theories (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Milne et 
al., 2000). Thus, we include security self-efficacy as an antecedent to protection motivation.  
H9: Insiders’ perceptions of security self-efficacy is positively related to their protection 
motivation. 
Researchers have long considered individuals’ perceptions of the efficacy of a desired response to 
have a motivational influence. Seminal works on efficacy have described the motivational influence of 
efficacy in terms of a dual model consisting of the efficacy of self and the efficacy of response (Bandura, 
1977). Similarly, expectancies have been described as involving both an action-outcome association and 
an outcome-outcome association (Vroom, 1964). From this perspective, motivation depends on 
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individuals’ beliefs that with effort they can enact a response (action leads to outcome) and, further, that 
the response they enact ultimately brings about the desired result (efficacy of the response). This latter 
expectancy has been a fundamental part of PMT since its inception, and we hypothesize individuals’ 
perceptions of response efficacy relates positively to their protection motivation. 
H10: Insiders’ perceptions of response efficacy is positively related to their protection 
motivation. 
The scope of PMT includes the factors that increase motivation (i.e., protection motivation) and 
ultimately lead to behavioral elicitation (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). However, this does not mean 
that measuring behaviors along with protection motivation is incongruous with PMT. The role of 
intentions in PMT parallels their role in other prominent behavioral theories, such as the theories of 
reasoned action and planned behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1972), which assert that 
intentions often mediate behaviors. Hence, the point of PMT is to increase the motivation and 
performance of adaptive behaviors. It is a natural application of PMT to test the relationship between 
intention and behavior, and previous evaluations have assessed both PMT intentions and behaviors in a 
variety of contexts. Consequently, we expect protection motivation will be positively related to PMBs.  
H11: Insiders’ protection motivation levels are positively related to insiders’ engagement in 
PMBs.  
5. Research Methodology 
To test our model empirically, we surveyed organizational insiders through a panel provided by an 
online market-research firm. Panels are especially appropriate for gathering security data because they 
offer full anonymity, not simply confidentiality. Given the sensitive nature of responses regarding 
security outcomes within organizations, anonymity was necessary to encourage candid responses, and 
panels provided increased anonymity in multiple ways. First, the researchers never know the identity of 
respondents, and the data provider guarantees and governs the privacy of respondents. Second, 
respondents’ actual and perceived anonymity is enhanced because they receive access to the survey 
outside their organizations’ networks and computers and because the survey is administered and analyzed 
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outside their organizations. Providing anonymous, off-site access to self-report surveys has been 
established as a leading method to elicit incidences of sensitive behaviors, such as PMBs (Posey et al., 
2013), organizational whistle-blowing (Lowry et al., 2013), increasing accountability of organization 
insiders (Vance et al., 2013), as well as socially undesirable behaviors, such as computer abuse (Lowry et 
al., 2015; Lowry et al., 2014) and organizational deviance (Bennett & Robinson, 2000, 2003). 
Methodologists also recommend these conditions to eliminate potential common-method biases 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
Because this study examines the security-related behaviors of insiders, we requested responses from 
a panel of employed insiders working in both the public and private sectors in the U.S. Using online 
panels also increases certainty that the sampled population represents the targeted population, and 
explicitly targeting insiders makes the findings more likely to be generalizable to the entire population of 
insiders. Initially, we received responses from 522 organizational insiders. After excluding incomplete 
responses and screening for non-conscientious responding (e.g., straight-ticket responding), our final 
sample was 377 respondents. This figure equates to a usable-to-collected response rate of 72.2%, which 
meets or exceeds the rate of other similar research (D'Arcy et al., 2014). As recommended, none of the 
respondents in our retained sample had missing values for greater than 5% of all items, and we employed 
mean replacement for all missing values (Hair et al., 2014). Further, our sample size surpassed the 
minimum threshold for detecting weak effects (i.e., R2 = 0.10; α = 0.01; power = 0.80) (Cohen, 1992). In 
our final sample, the respondents had a mean age of 46 years (SD = 14.51) and a mean organizational 
tenure of 11 years (SD = 9.56), 51% were female, and 58% had at least an undergraduate degree. 
Additionally, 12.2% worked in the IS department of their organization, and 38% reported working in 
some level of management. 
5.1 Study Measures 
In this section, we briefly describe the study’s measures; we present the full measures in Appendix 
A. We begin with a discussion of our measures for the PsyCap higher-order construct. We then consider 
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the threat and coping appraisals separately. Finally, we conclude this section with a discussion of our 
outcome variables: protection motivation and PMBs.  
5.2 PsyCap Construct 
We measured PsyCap by using items from the previously published PsyCap Questionnaire (Luthans 
et al., 2007b). The original PsyCap Questionnaire comprises 24 items (six for each of the four 
characteristics). For this study, we retained at least four items for every underlying characteristic of 
PsyCap. The items in the PsyCap Questionnaire were adapted by Luthans and colleagues from previous 
literature to reflect state-like, work-related positive resource capabilities (Luthans et al., 2007a; Luthans et 
al., 2007b). Specifically, Luthans et al. (2007b) developed the items measuring hope from the State Hope 
scale (Snyder et al., 1996); the items measuring role-breadth self-efficacy from Parker (1998); the items 
measuring optimism from Scheier and Carver (1985); and the items measuring resilience from Wagnild 
and Young (1993). Similar to previous findings using the PsyCap Questionnaire (Avey et al., 2010), we 
found the subconstructs exhibited sound reliabilities (self-efficacy composite reliability [CR] = 0.90; 
optimism CR = 0.84; hope CR = 0.88, and resilience CR= 0.80). An example of an item from the PsyCap 
Questionnaire measuring resilience is “I usually take stressful things at work in stride.”  
5.3 Threat Appraisal Constructs 
We measured both organizational threat vulnerability and threat severity with items from prior PMT 
and fear appeals research (Witte et al., 1996; Workman et al., 2008). Similar to findings in recent PMT 
research using these measures (Posey et al., 2015a), we found strong evidence of validity and reliability 
of these measures (threat vulnerability CR = 0.91; threat severity CR = 0.92). An item measuring threat 
vulnerability is “My organization’s information and information systems are vulnerable to security 
threats.” An example of an item measuring threat severity is “Threats to the security of my organization’s 
information and information systems are severe.” 
We measured maladaptive rewards with six items developed and validated in Posey et al. (2010); 
and Posey et al. (2015a). These items reflect intrinsic and extrinsic benefits an insider may gain from 
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failing to enact PMBs. An example of an item for the extrinsic benefit of maladaptive behavior is “It is 
likely that I would receive personal rewards for purposefully not protecting my organization’s 
information and information systems from security threats.” An example of an item for the intrinsic 
benefit of maladaptive behavior is “I would feel a sense of internal satisfaction for allowing information 
security threats to harm my organization.” As in prior research (Posey et al., 2010), our maladaptive 
rewards construct exhibited strong validity and reliability (CR = 0.92). 
We measured fear by using four items from Block and Keller (1995). This construct has been used in 
other PMT studies and has exhibited strong reliability (Posey et al., 2015a). To capture insiders’ levels of 
fear of information security threats, we asked them “When thinking about the security threats to your 
organization’s information and information systems, to what extent do you feel…?” An example of an 
item from the fear scale is “frightened.” Similar to the previous PMT study employing fear (Posey et al., 
2015a), our measure exhibited strong validity and reliability (CR = 0.95). 
5.4 Coping Appraisal Constructs 
We measured the coping appraisal constructs, response efficacy, security self-efficacy, and response 
cost, all with items adapted from previous PMT research (Workman et al., 2008). Each of these measures 
has exhibited strong reliability in previous PMT studies (Posey et al., 2015a). An example of an item 
measuring security response efficacy is “Employee efforts to keep my organization’s information and 
information systems safe from information security threats are effective.” An example of an item 
measuring security self-efficacy is “For me, taking information security precautions to protect my 
organization’s information and information systems is easy.” An example item measuring response cost is 
“The inconvenience of implementing recommended security measures to protect my organization’s 
information and information systems exceeds the potential benefits.” In our study, as in previous research 
(Posey et al., 2015a; Workman et al., 2008), we found strong reliabilities for the coping appraisal 
constructs (security response efficacy CR = 0.87; security self-efficacy CR = 0.83; response cost CR= 
0.89).  
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5.5 Protection Motivation and PMB Constructs 
We measured protection motivation as an intention to perform protective behaviors (i.e., PMBs), and 
the scale was developed in accordance with the views of previous behaviorists (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1972). We drew the three items selected to assess insiders’ protection motivations from Posey et al. 
(2010); and Posey et al. (2015a). An example of an item measuring protection motivation is “I intend to 
protect my organization from its information security threats.” Similar to previous PMT research 
employing this scale to capture insiders’ protection motivations (Posey et al., 2015a), in our study, 
protection motivation exhibited strong validity and reliability (CR = 0.78). 
Finally, we measured PMBs with a five-item scale on the basis of the taxonomy of PMBs (Posey et 
al., 2015b; Posey et al., 2013). This instrument captures insiders’ protective security actions across 
myriad occupations, organizations, and industries; thus, it reflects PMB activity at the overall level. More 
specifically, in a recent research effort (Posey et al., 2015b), this five-item measure captured more than 
70% of the conceptual domain created by 45 unique protective behaviors in nine unique clusters (e.g., 
account protection, policy-driven awareness and action, protection against unauthorized exposure, and 
identification and reporting of security matters). An example of an item measuring PMBs is “I actively 
attempted to protect my organization’s information and computerized information systems.” Again, as in 
previous research on insiders’ performance of PMBs (Posey et al., 2015a), our PMB construct exhibited 
strong validity and reliability in our study (CR = 0.96).  
6. Analyses and Results 
As methodologists recommend, we analyzed the research model in a two-step procedure (Gerbing & 
Anderson, 1988), and our analysis used the covariance-based structural equation modelling (CB-SEM) 
platform, Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010). In the first step, we assessed the validity of the 
measures in the structural model. Upon confirmation of the validity of the research model, we also 
assessed the hypothesized research model by CB-SEM. As recommended by methodologists (Gefen et al., 
2011), before proceeding to our analyses, we first assessed key assumptions about the data by reviewing 
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skewness and kurtosis to assess normality and variance inflation factors (VIFs) to assess collinearity 
among constructs. We found that in every instance, the VIF was below the most conservative thresholds 
(Petter et al., 2007), and we found none of the individual kurtosis and skewness values exhibited even 
moderate levels of non-normality (West et al., 1995). In fact, only one kurtosis value was above an 
absolute value of 1, with none above 1.4 and only two skewness values were above an absolute value of 
1, with none above 1.4. To ensure our SEM model results were conservative, as in prior PMT research 
(Posey et al., 2015a), we ran our CFA and SEM analyses with a variant of the Maximum Likelihood 
(ML) estimator in Mplus that produces robust standard errors (MLR) for the ML parameter estimates 
(Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010).  
6.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
The validity and reliability of the employed measures are critical to the execution of any study 
(Gefen et al., 2011; Straub, 1989). Although all scales in this study had been previously used as 
recommended, per Straub et al. (2004), we assessed instrument validity. For all the measures in the 
structural model, we considered the standardized factor loadings from a CFA analysis along with the 
composite reliabilities. Also, we assessed the convergent and discriminant validity of the measures in the 
structural model with average variance extracted (AVE) and a comparison of squared correlations with 
AVE, as methodologists recommend (Hair et al., 2006). 
We followed the prior literature in conceptualizing PsyCap as a higher-order construct (Luthans et 
al., 2007a). Specification is a theoretical decision based on the relationship among subconstructs. Luthans 
et al. (2007a) explain that “multidimensional constructs may have components relating to a core 
underlying factor whereby the shared variance or commonality between each facet comprises the higher-
order factor” (p. 549). A higher-order reflective specification is appropriate where there is a “general or 
more global factor that explains all the correlations between the first order factors” (Hair et al., 2014, p. 
231).  
Higher-order constructs have unique requirements compared to first-order measures. To assess the 
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validity of PsyCap as a higher-order construct, we followed the instructions provided by Muthén and 
Muthén (1998-2010). First, we assessed the lower-order factor validity for each subconstruct separately, 
then we assessed the subconstruct correlations. For the lower-order subconstructs, the usual metrics for 
lower-order convergence should be met with AVEs around 0.50 and construct reliabilities around 0.70. 
However, in contrast to first-order constructs, subconstructs of a higher-order reflective construct do not 
need to show discriminate validity. Additionally, the number of indicators should be similar across the 
subconstructs of a higher-order factor (Hair et al., 2014). Our subconstructs exhibited adequate 
convergence with a range of composite reliabilities of 0.79-0.90 and AVEs ranging between 0.494-0.655. 
As expected for the subconstructs of a higher-order factor, the PsyCap components were highly correlated 
with an average correlation of 0.86 and a range of 0.80-0.93, and thus, as suggested by methodologists for 
higher-order factors (Hair et al., 2014), the lower-order components failed to discriminate.  
Next, we continued with our CFA by assessing the validity of the remaining constructs, testing for 
convergent and discriminant validity as prior research recommends (e.g., Hair et al., 2006). We again 
considered composite reliabilities to assess the internal consistency of the measures. The range of 
reliabilities (i.e., 0.78–0.96) met the recommendations of prior research (Nunnally, 1978). We assessed 
convergent validity by calculating the AVE of each construct, whereas we assessed discriminant validity 
by comparing the squared correlations with AVE as prior research recommends (Hair et al., 2006). The 
AVEs were above the recommended value of 0.50 (Hair et al., 2006), ranging from 0.542 to 0.861. All 
but one pair of constructs met the Fornell-Larcker criterion with a greater AVE than all squared 
correlations (Hair et al., 2006).  
Interestingly, the two highest correlated pairs of constructs in our model were security self-efficacy 
with security response efficacy (r=0.95) and threat severity with threat vulnerability (r=0.79). These high 
correlations match those of previous PMT research (i.e., Posey et al., 2015a). Therefore, as recommended 
by previous researchers who found high correlations among these constructs (Posey et al., 2015a), we 
opted to drop security self-efficacy and threat vulnerability from our model and proceeded with security 
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response efficacy and threat severity. Our decision to retain security response efficacy and threat severity 
is further supported by a previous meta-analysis of PMT research, which found these two are more 
important than their highly correlated counterparts (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987). For concision, we include 
the statistics for both our original and refined (i.e., excluding security self-efficacy and threat 
vulnerability) measurement models at the conclusion of the article in Tables 5 and 6. Our refined CFA 
model exhibits adequate fit with χ2 = 1680.968 df =1095; scaling correction factor for MLR = 1.1231; 
CFI=0.947; TLI =0.944; RMSEA=0.038; SRMR=0.048 (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  
6.2 Structural Model 
Finally, we assessed the hypothesized relationships. The structural model results are summarized in 
Table 2, and we present a detailed exhibit of our empirical model (both structural and measurement 
components) in Figure 3 at the conclusion of the article. As shown in Table 2, the structural model 
exhibits adequate fit with χ2 = 1926.706; df = 1112; scaling correction factor for MLR = 1.1256. The CFI 
and TLI values of 0.927 and 0.923, respectively are both above the recommended level (Gefen et al., 
2011). Additionally, the RMSEA value of 0.044 meets the conservative cutoff value for “good” fit (Gefen 
et al., 2011). We would note that the SRMR value of 0.098 is borderline with regard to the Hu and 
Bentler (1999) recommendation of “close to 0.08” (p. 1). However, as noted by Gefen et al. (2011), not 
all fit indices should be expected to be within threshold rules of thumb when multiple indices are 
reported. Of the 11 hypotheses tested, 10 were supported (i.e., they were significant and in the predicted 
direction). We report standardized coefficients to aid in the interpretation of our results, which is 
especially helpful for models with higher-order factors (Bagozzi & Yi, 2012).  
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Table 2. Structural Model Results 
Predicted and Tested Relationship β Coefficient t-value (sig.) 
H1a. PsyCap  Threat vulnerability Not examined  
H1b. PsyCap  Threat severity -0.175 2.802** 
H1c. PsyCap  Maladaptive rewards -0.222 3.854*** 
H1d. PsyCap  Response cost -0.353 6.159*** 
H1e. PsyCap  Security self-efficacy Not examined  
H1f. PsyCap  Response efficacy 0.523 10.351*** 
H2. Threat vulnerability  Fear Not examined  
H3. Threat severity  Fear 0.345 6.671*** 
H4. Threat vulnerability  Protection motivation Not examined  
H5. Threat severity  Protection motivation 0.167 3.155** 
H6. Maladaptive rewards  Protection motivation -0.148 2.642** 
H7. Fear  Protection motivation 0.053 0.853 
H8. Response cost  Protection motivation -0.283 3.587*** 
H9. Security self-efficacy  Protection motivation Not examined  
H10. Response efficacy  Protection motivation 0.609 9.215*** 
H11. Protection motivation  PMBs 0.595 11.110*** 
Estimator: MLR Chi-Square = 1926.706 DF=1112; Scaling Correction Factor for MLR = 1.1256 
CFI=0.927; TLI=0.923; RMSEA=0.044; SRMR=0.098 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05; Protection motivation: R2 = 0.571; PMBs: R2 = 0.354 
  
To establish the robustness of the model, we re-ran our structural model controlling for age, years of 
organizational tenure, gender, and whether the respondent had a managerial role and/or was an IT staff 
member of the organization. Being an IT staff member was positively related to protection motivation (p 
= 0.01), whereas all other controls were insignificant. Figure 2 depicts our final structural model results 
including controls.  
 
Figure 2. Structural Results Including Controls 
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6.3 Post-Hoc Analyses 
Next, we conducted three post-hoc analyses. First, we conducted formal tests to assess the indirect 
relationship of PsyCap with protection motivation and PMBs through the PMT mechanisms. Second, we 
performed a formal test to detect any common method bias (CMV). Third, we assessed the level of 
protection motivation and PMBs for insiders with relatively high and low PsyCap.  
Indirect relationships among variables can be assessed by producing confidence intervals through a 
resampling, or bootstrap, procedure (MacKinnon et al., 2004). To formally assess the indirect 
relationships among PsyCap, protection motivation, and PMBs, we constructed bias-controlled 95% 
confidence intervals using Mplus’ model indirect procedure (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010). Because we 
found no significant deviations from normality in our data and the direction of our model parameters and 
significance statistics were the same for both the ML and MLR estimators, we were able to perform 
indirect analyses using the ML estimator—a requirement in Mplus. As exhibited by (Vance et al., 2015), 
we ran a bootstrap procedure producing 5,000 resamples to construct bias-controlled confidence intervals. 
We found significant direct effects for all indirect relationships except the relationships of PsyCap with 
protection motivation and PMBs via threat severity and fear. Table 3 exhibits the indirect effects.   
Table 3. Indirect effects of PsyCap 
Bootstrapped CI tests for indirect effects 
Relationship 
Indirect Effect 
2.5%t  
Lower-bound Estimate 
97.5%t 
Upper-bound 
Indirect 
Effect? 
PsyCap’s relationship with protection motivation (PM) 
     PM on PsyCap via threat severity -0.055 -0.029 -0.003 Yes 
     PM on PsyCap via maladaptive rewards 0.001 0.033 0.065 Yes 
     PM on PsyCap via threat severity and fear -0.012 -0.003 0.005 No 
     PM on PsyCap via response cost 0.030 0.100 0.169 Yes 
     PM on PsyCap via security response efficacy 0.214 0.319 0.423 Yes 
PsyCap’s relationship with PMBs  
     PMBs on PsyCap via threat severity and PM -0.033 -0.017 -0.002 Yes 
     PMBs on PsyCap via maladaptive rewards and PM  0.001 0.019 0.038 Yes 
     PMBs on PsyCap via threat severity, fear, and PM -0.007 -0.002 0.003 No 
     PMBs on PsyCap via response cost and PM 0.018 0.059 0.100 Yes 
     PMBs on PsyCap via security response efficacy and PM 0.114 0.189 0.265 Yes 
Estimator: ML Chi-Square = 2168.658 DF=1112; CFI=0.925; TLI=0.921; RMSEA=0.050; SRMR=0.098; 
resamples=5,000; tbias-controlled confidence intervals 
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As a post-hoc assessment of potential sample bias due to common-method variance (CMV), we 
followed the procedures for the CFA marker-variable technique previous research recommends 
(Richardson et al., 2009). CB-SEM is particularly well suited for our chosen CMV analyses, because, 
unlike other techniques (e.g., unmeasured latent method construct [ULMC] technique), the CFA marker-
variable technique specifies the comparison of free and constrained models in a way that allows for 
appropriate model identification (Liang et al., 2007; Williams et al., 2010). Also, despite being the most 
frequently used technique, the ULMC has been found to have serious shortcomings in both detecting and 
correcting CMV (Chin et al., 2012). Conversely, the CFA marker-variable technique, has been found to 
detect CMV accurately and consistently (Richardson et al., 2009). 
With the goal of assessing CMV, we included a marker variable in our survey (i.e., a construct with 
no theoretical basis for correlation with our substantive constructs). The CFA marker-variable technique 
uses multiple CFA analyses to test for (1) CMV, (2) unequal (congeneric) method variance, and (3) bias 
due to CMV. The results of our CFA marker-variable tests indicated no biases in our sample from CMV 
(see Appendix B).  
We also conducted a post-hoc exploration of PsyCap and PMT in which we ran t-tests to examine 
the level of protection motivation and PMBs for insiders with relatively high and low PsyCap. We found 
significantly higher levels of protection motivation and PMBs for those with higher PsyCap. We include 
the results of this post-hoc analysis in Appendix C. 
7. Discussion 
The burgeoning field of positive psychology has introduced a relatively new paradigm for 
understanding work-related functioning and motivation. Building on this important foundation, a goal of 
our study was to assess the relationship of insiders’ PsyCap with the traditional information security 
theory of PMT. Because PMT was originally developed as an appeal to individuals’ fears, the relationship 
between PsyCap and the mechanisms PMT employs were unknown. Drawing on previous studies, we 
developed hypotheses for PsyCap’s varying relationship with the unique PMT facets, including the oft-
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excluded components of maladaptive rewards and response costs. Interestingly, we found that PsyCap 
significantly explains variance in each dimension of PMT. In fact, PsyCap works in the same direction as 
PMT on three of four tested motivational appeals; it relates positively with the positive coping mechanism 
of security response efficacy and negatively with the negative motivational mechanisms of maladaptive 
rewards and response cost.  
Furthermore, through our post-hoc test for indirect effects, we found support for the relationship of 
PsyCap with protection motivation and PMBs through PMT’s mechanisms. The strongest indirect 
relationship in our analyses was between PsyCap and protection motivation via security response 
efficacy. This is an important finding because (1) PyCap has the strongest relationship (in terms of beta 
coefficient) with security response efficacy of any of the PMT mechanisms, and (2) security response 
efficacy has the strongest relationship with protection motivation (in terms of beta coefficient) of any 
PMT mechanism tested in our model. Thus, our findings indicate that PsyCap is most strongly related 
with the PMT mechanism that has the strongest relationship with protection motivation. 
As we hypothesized, however, some of the relationships between PsyCap and PMT do not support 
the theoretical motivational appeal of PMT. For example, we found that insiders’ PsyCap is negatively 
related to perceptions of threat severity, which were originally conceived in PMT as mechanisms that 
increase motivation through fear. Despite this potential conflict of motivational view between positive 
psychology and PMT, as shown in Figure 2, PsyCap does not remove the perception of threat severity’s 
relationship with protection motivation and PMBs (i.e., threat severity retained significance in the model). 
This is an important point and may actually increase the efficacy of PMT as a whole because 
overwhelming perceptions of threat severity may lead to a level of fear that is counterproductive to 
positive motivation and results in insiders’ engagement in an avoidance response. Specifically, if fear is 
too strong (e.g., overwhelms one’s efficacy), it can act to narrow the repertoire of behavioral responses 
cognitively available to the actor (Fredrickson, 2001) and trigger a state of readiness for withdrawal 
behavior such as “flight” (Bagozzi et al., 1999). For example, helpless feelings stemming from 
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perceptions of insurmountable severity have the potential to elicit maladaptive responses, such as 
avoidance and/or withdrawal behaviors (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Diener & Dweck, 1980). That is, some 
threat-related perceptions may lead to adaptive coping and elicit PMBs, whereas others may lead to 
helpless feelings and maladaptive coping, such as the withdrawal from security roles (Burns et al., 2015). 
In our study, we found that threat severity relates positively to fear experienced due to perceptions of 
organizational information security threats; however, fear does not translate into positive motivation to 
protect the firm. In other words, we did not find a significant link between fear and protection motivation.  
While this was not our hypothesized result, it is supported by the results of previous research that 
challenge the presence of a fear response in relation to the PMT mechanisms (Warkentin et al., 2016). We 
believe this finding is attributable to the nature of fear in our context. As an emotional response, fear 
arises from an appraisal of threatening stimuli and engenders a cognitive and physiological reaction 
(Bagozzi et al., 1999). Further, emotions are transient states (Fredrickson, 2001). Therefore, we assert that 
the relationship between fear and behavior is more readily observed in the presence of direct fear 
manipulation at the time of the action than in the “pre-kinetic” level of behavioral intention (Willison & 
Warkentin, 2013). This was shown by Boss et al. (2015) who used direct fear-appeal manipulations. Our 
research does not employ direct fear-appeal manipulations, which can be further considered in future 
PsyCap research.  
Importantly, threat vulnerability and threat severity were too highly correlated to both be included in 
our model. This finding perhaps points to the reality that, in our study, respondents perceived that the 
more vulnerable the organization is to threats, the more significant are the threats. Finally, through post-
hoc analyses, we found that insiders with higher PsyCap report higher levels of protection motivation and 
PMBs. This finding—in light of the negative relationship between PsyCap and the threat-focused appeals 
of threat vulnerability and threat severity—points to the strong relationship between the coping appraisal 
mechanisms in PMT and proactive security-related behaviors (i.e., protection motivation and PMBs). In 
our study, as in previous studies, we found that the coping appraisal is much more influential in the 
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development of protection motivation levels than is the threat appraisal (i.e., in terms of the magnitude of 
beta coefficients).  
7.1 Implications and Contributions 
Our research has important implications for both academicians and practitioners who are interested 
in eliciting positive security behaviors among organizational insiders. In the context of IS security, 
PsyCap is simply insiders’ psychological resources available to support optimal functioning. As a 
psychological resource, PsyCap has been shown to be important for organizational and personal 
outcomes. By considering PsyCap’s relationship with the mechanisms of PMT, we calibrate the theory 
with the evolving perspective that information security is an optimal organizational outcome that insiders 
across the organization must consider. The positive psychological resources PsyCap embodies are 
especially important for insider-focused security given current workplace environments, which require 
insiders to adapt and select (i.e., to differentiate their behavior) from a wide array of activities within a 
behavioral repertoire of security-focused options (e.g., Posey et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, our results indicate that PsyCap enhances the efficacious coping appraisal mechanisms 
within PMT by increasing security response-efficacy and reducing perceptions of security response costs. 
PsyCap also acts to decrease perceptions of potential maladaptive rewards for not performing the positive 
security-oriented activities—an important consideration should insiders actively contemplate personal 
rewards for not engaging in adaptive responses against organizational security threats. 
The introduction of PsyCap into IS security is itself an important contribution because PsyCap 
contains the state-like elements of positive psychology. Research has shown that individuals can develop 
these elements and that these elements link to a number of important positive organizational outcomes. 
PsyCap components offer a unique opportunity to ascertain the synergistic relationship among insiders’ 
characteristics and organizational security, along with other important organizational outcomes, such as 
job performance and satisfaction (Luthans et al., 2007a), low absenteeism (Avey et al., 2006), and low 
turnover and stress (Avey et al., 2009). As we discussed previously, each of these outcomes represents 
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security issues within organizations.  
Table 4. Improving Organizational Security Efforts with PsyCap Interventions  
PsyCap 
Component 
Micro-developments in a 
Security Context 
PCI Strategies 
Hope 
(goal setting) 
1. Security goal setting 
2. Security participation  
3. Security contingency 
planning  
1. Develop specific, reasonable, achievable employee-level 
goals related to information security (e.g., enactment of 
PMBs).  
2. Include employees in the security goal development 
process. 
3. Tailor SETA efforts to include contingency plans for 
if/when a security threat arises.  
Resilience 
(positive 
coping 
strategies) 
1. Security asset-focused 
strategies  
2. Security risk-focused 
strategies, such as 
proactive avoidance of 
adversity 
3. Security process-
focused strategies  
1. Reinforce the transferable value of security-enhancing 
behaviors in career development. 
2. Educate employees on the potential personal work-related 
benefits (e.g., fewer interruptions, enhanced firm 
reputation) from enacting PMBs to help the firm avoid 
information security threats.  
3. Encourage employees to incorporate PMBs into their 
behavioral repertoire step-by-step to increase perceived 
controllability and effort during adversity.  
Optimism 
(past, present, 
future) 
1. Leniency for the past 
security failures 
2. Appreciation for the 
present security threats 
3. Identifying future 
opportunities to 
enhance security  
1. Use past security shortcomings as “teachable moments” to 
encourage future PMBs.  
2. Train employees to see current security threats as an 
opportunity to protect the firm as opposed to an opportunity 
for failure.  
3. Counteract pessimism regarding information security 
through the development of realistic, yet optimistic, 
expectations. 
Self-efficacy 
(mastery, 
persuasion, 
and arousal) 
1. Security mastery 
experiences 
2. Modelling and 
vicarious learning  
3. Security social 
persuasion  
4. Security physiological 
and psychological 
arousal 
1. Develop SETA efforts that enable “small successes” by 
breaking down security goals into achievable tasks.  
2. Incorporate mentorship activities into SETA programs that 
allow employees to observe success and learn from others’ 
failures.  
3. Provide positive feedback to employees enacting PMBs. 
4. Reduce security-related stress by equipping employees with 
effective response mechanisms and clear policies. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as a construct comprising state-like subconstructs, PsyCap 
provides managers with a model for the design of vetting procedures and subsequent insider training. 
They can develop insiders’ PsyCap at either the subconstruct level or the macro level. Peterson et al. 
(2011) assert that “employees’ level of psychological capital is also subject to change (increase or 
decrease) depending on the work context such as the amount of social support they receive, leadership, 
and/or organizational climate” (p. 432). The construct-level development of PsyCap opens the door for 
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research into the antecedents of PsyCap. This opportunity is especially important in light of the present 
study, which found that PsyCap is related to each component of PMT’s threat and coping appraisal 
mechanisms included in our study. Thus, our broadened PMT approach provides a theoretically sound 
context in which to establish the relationship between PsyCap and motivational appeals for employees to 
perform positive security behaviors (i.e., PMBs). To augment these practical implications, we 
contextualize the PsyCap development strategies in an information security context and offer 
opportunities for improving organizational security programs with the inclusion of PsyCap interventions 
in Table 4. These prescriptions should aid organizational managers in the formation, delivery, and 
maintenance of internal security-related efforts to further enhance the organization’s security posture. 
Given insiders’ unprecedented access to the IS of organizations and organizations’ increased foci on 
the positive psychological aspects of their employees, the investigation of PsyCap’s relationship with 
PMT provides an important contribution to IS security research. The results of this study support the 
symbiotic relationship between positive psychological factors and organizational security outcomes. 
Consequently, investments in employees’ PsyCap, whether generally (as Table 1 describes) or within a 
security context (as Table 4 describes), can be thought of as investments in information security.  
7.2 Limitations and Future Research 
This study offers initial insights into the relationship of PsyCap with a traditional theory in IS 
security research, PMT. As such, it is not without limitations. Our study focused on the relationship 
between PsyCap and the traditional PMT model rather than testing additional hypotheses introduced to 
the base PMT model. Therefore, the PMT model we presented does not include some of the constructs 
that have been considered alongside PMT, such as social influence (Lee & Larsen, 2009) and descriptive 
norms (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010), although these are not core PMT constructs. Future research should 
explore the relationship of PsyCap with extended versions of PMT and other established motivational 
theories.  
PsyCap’s state-like characteristics make it uniquely qualified for use in IS security, and it has already 
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been shown to serve as an important mediator (Luthans et al., 2008b) and moderator (Chadwick & Raver, 
2013; Cheung et al., 2011) in important individual-organization relationships. Therefore, future IS 
research considering PsyCap should study not only its relationship with security or other variables of 
interest, but also the mediating and/or moderating relationship of PsyCap with important IS relationships. 
PsyCap is also amenable to experimentation, and researchers can study the manipulation of PsyCap, 
either through micro intervention or by the manipulation of organizational climate perceptions, and 
measure the resulting influence on IS-related outcomes. Given the malleability of PsyCap and its 
established relationship with the mechanisms of PMT, research into the antecedents of PsyCap will also 
offer insights into IS security. Finally, given the relationship of role-breadth, work-related PsyCap with 
the PMT mechanisms, future research could develop a more targeted measure of PsyCap that captures 
hope, optimism, efficacy, and resilience as it relates specifically to information security (i.e., a measure of 
insiders’ security PsyCap). 
As a final possible limitation, the use of panels is not readily amenable to researchers’ assessments of 
intentions and actual behaviors at separate time periods with the same set of participants. Further, the 
nature of a cross-sectional design makes it much more difficult for researchers to determine when 
respondents actually formed perceptions and intentions and performed behaviors of interest when 
compared with highly controlled experimental approaches where researchers can assess the formation of 
intentions regarding novel phenomena. Therefore, similar to previous research efforts (Liang & Xue, 
2010; Pahnila et al., 2007), we chose to assess protection motivation levels (i.e., intentions) and PMBs 
(i.e., behaviors) in contemporary fashion. This approach assists in dealing with the variation that occurs 
when intentions change from two measurement time points (i.e., temporal instability of intentions) 
(Conner & Godin, 2007) and the likelihood that the relationship between intentions and behavior 
diminishes as time elapses (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Davis, 1989). Additionally, previous research has 
provided evidence that the association assessed by the contemporary measurement of intentions and 
behaviors can be higher than the correlation between intentions and behaviors assessed at different time 
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periods (Davis, 1989).  
8. Conclusion 
Our work extends the IS security literature that examines how to influence employees to engage in 
protective security actions that improve organizational security. We related this view of insiders to that of 
the positive psychology movement, which focuses on the optimal functioning of the average person. 
Drawing on this possibility, we proposed a research model and empirically examined the relationship of 
insiders’ PsyCap with PMT’s core mechanisms.  
By including PsyCap in concert with PMT, we contextualized a well-established theory in IS 
security within the emerging perspective of positive psychology—all while retaining its original 
nomological domain. Assessing the relationship between PsyCap and PMT also reflects advances in the 
study of human functioning and motivation, providing important motivational antecedents that 
complement the original PMT model. Additionally, by including PsyCap’s role-breadth considerations, 
we better calibrated PMT to predict role-breadth behaviors (such as PMBs) in insiders’ behavioral 
repertoires. Having established the relationship of PsyCap with insiders’ motivations to protect their 
organizations, our study highlights opportunities for future research into PsyCap and other similar 
psychological constructs in IS security. Practitioners can draw on these examples to leverage the 
organizational benefits of positive psychology within the information security function of the 
organization, and academicians can incorporate these strategies into future research on organizational 
security programs.  
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Table 1. Initial Measurement Model Statistics 
Latent Construct M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) Self-efficacyt 5.29 1.17 0.90              
(2) Optimismt 4.91 1.14 0.80 0.84             
(3) Resiliencet 5.51 0.92 0.86 0.84 0.80            
(4) Hopet 5.35 1.00 0.88 0.85 0.93 0.88           
(5) Fear 2.03 1.25 -0.21 -0.21 -0.23 -0.23 0.95          
(6) Threat severity 3.37 1.54 -0.14 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 0.34 0.91         
(7) Threat Vulnerability 3.41 1.51 -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 -0.18 0.34 0.79a 0.92        
(8) Security response efficacy 5.36 1.14 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.49 -0.23 -0.12 -0.24 0.87       
(9) Response cost 2.68 1.37 -0.29 -0.28 -0.31 -0.31 0.32 0.26 0.32 -0.53 0.89      
(10) Security self-efficacy 5.25 1.16 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.47 -0.18 -0.05 -0.12 0.95b -0.54 0.83     
(11) Maladaptive rewards 1.95 1.29 -0.18 -0.17 -0.19 -0.19 0.29 0.36 0.35 -0.23 0.55 -0.20 0.92    
(12) Protection motivation 5.61 1.26 0.43 0.42 0.45 0.46 -0.19 -0.04 -0.11 0.71 -0.58 0.73 -0.37 0.78   
(13) PMBs 4.94 1.74 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.13 0.16 0.07 0.47 -0.29 0.56 -0.06 0.60 0.96  
(14) PsyCap 5.26 0.95 0.90 0.88 0.96 0.97 -0.24 -0.15 -0.18 0.50 -0.32 0.49 -0.20 0.48 0.21 0.96 
Estimator: MLR Chi-Square = 2347.289 DF=1490; Scaling Correction Factor for MLR = 1.1157; CFI=0.937; TLI=0.932; RMSEA=0.039; SRMR=0.048 
tPsyCap Subconstructs 
aHigh correlation between threat severity and threat vulnerability 
bSecurity self-efficacy and security response efficacy failed Fornell-Larcker criterion. 
Composite reliabilities shown on diagonal. 
 
Table 2. Refined Measurement Model Statistics 
Latent Construct M SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) Self-efficacyt 5.29 1.17 0.90            
(2) Optimismt 4.91 1.14 0.80 0.84           
(3) Resiliencet 5.51 0.92 0.86 0.84 0.80          
(4) Hopet 5.35 1.00 0.88 0.85 0.93 0.88         
(5) Fear 2.03 1.25 -0.21 -0.21 -0.23 -0.23 0.95        
(6) Threat severity 3.37 1.54 -0.14 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 0.34 0.91       
(8) Security response efficacy 5.36 1.14 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.48 -0.23 -0.13 0.87      
(9) Response cost 2.68 1.37 -0.29 -0.28 -0.31 -0.31 0.32 0.27 -0.53 0.89     
(10) Maladaptive rewards 1.95 1.29 -0.18 -0.17 -0.19 -0.19 0.29 0.36 -0.23 0.55 0.92    
(11) Protection motivation 5.61 1.26 0.43 0.42 0.45 0.46 -0.19 -0.04 0.70 -0.58 -0.37 0.78   
(12) PMBs 4.94 1.74 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.13 0.16 0.47 -0.29 -0.06 0.60 0.96  
(13) PsyCap 5.26 0.95 0.90 0.88 0.96 0.97 -0.24 -0.16 0.50 -0.32 -0.20 0.48 0.21 0.96 
Estimator: MLR Chi-Square = 1680.968 DF=1095; Scaling Correction Factor for MLR = 1.1231; CFI=0.947 TLI =0.944; RMSEA=0.038; SRMR=0.048 
tPsyCap Subconstructs 
Composite reliabilities shown on diagonal. 
   
 
Figure 1. Empirical Model: Measurement and Structural Components 
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Appendix A. Measurement details 
Table 3. Study Measures 
Measures 
(Citations) 
Prompts and Measurement Items Mean Std. 
PsyCap hopei 
(Luthans et al., 
2007a) 
Instructions: ”Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statements:” 
  
PCH-1. If I should find myself in a jam at work, I could think of many ways 
to get out of it. 
5.30 1.24 
PCH-2. At the present time, I am energetically pursuing my work goals. 5.12 1.40 
PCH-3. There are lots of ways around any problem. 5.42 1.21 
PCH-4. Right now I see myself as being pretty successful at work. 5.50 1.27 
PCH-5. I can think of many ways to reach my current work goals. 5.30 1.21 
PCH-6. At this time, I am meeting the work goals that I set for myself. 5.44 1.23 
PsyCap 
resilience 
(Luthans et al., 
2007a) 
Instructions: ”Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statements:” 
  
PCR-2. I usually manage difficulties one way or another at work. 5.65 1.02 
PCR-4. I usually take stressful things at work in stride. 5.15 1.31 
PCR-5. I can get through difficult times at work because I’ve experienced 
difficulty before. 
5.56 1.21 
PCR-6. I feel I can handle many things at a time at this job. 5.71 1.15 
PsyCap 
optimismi 
(Luthans et al., 
2007a) 
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statements:” 
  
PCO-1. When things are uncertain for me at work, I usually expect the best. 4.64 1.40 
PCO-3. I always look on the bright side of things regarding my job. 5.17 1.31 
PCO-4. I’m optimistic about what will happen to me in the future as it 
pertains to work. 
4.96 1.52 
PCO-6. I approach this job as if ‘every cloud has a silver lining’. 4.85 1.35 
PsyCap self-
efficacyi 
(Luthans et al., 
2007a) 
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statements:” 
  
PCSE-1. I feel confident analyzing a long-term problem to find a solution. 5.34 1.30 
PCSE-2. I feel confident in representing my work area in meetings with 
management. 
5.38 1.39 
PCSE-3. I feel confident contributing to discussions about the company’s 
strategy. 
5.04 1.44 
PCSE-4. I feel confident helping to set targets/goals in my work area. 5.31 1.29 
PCSE-6. I feel confident presenting information to a group of colleagues. 5.36 1.50 
Fearii  
(Block & Keller, 
1995) 
Instructions: “When thinking about the security threats to your 
organization’s information and information systems, to what extent do you 
feel...” 
  
Fear-1. Frightened 1.84 1.25 
Fear-2. Nervous 2.05 1.36 
Fear-3. Anxious 2.12 1.39 
Fear-4. Uncomfortable 2.11 1.36 
Threat 
vulnerabilityi 
(Workman et al., 
2008) 
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statements about information security threats to your organization:” 
  
TV-1. My organization’s information and information systems are 
vulnerable to security threats. 
3.34 1.65 
TV-2. It is likely that an information security violation will occur to my 
organization’s information and information systems. 
3.36 1.68 
TV-3. My organization’s information and information systems are at risk to 
information security threats. 
3.43 1.69 
TV-4. My organization’s information and information systems are 3.50 1.66 
Measures 
(Citations) 
Prompts and Measurement Items Mean Std. 
susceptible to information security threats. 
Threat severityi 
(Workman et al., 
2008) 
 
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statements about information security threats to your organization:” 
  
TS-1. Threats to the security of my organization’s information and 
information systems are severe. 
3.17 1.70 
TS-2. In terms of information security violations, attacks on my 
organization’s information and information systems are severe. 
2.98 1.64 
TS-3. I believe that threats to the security of my organization’s information 
and information systems are serious. 
3.81 1.85 
TS-4. I believe that threats to the security of my organization’s information 
and information systems are significant. 
3.54 1.77 
Security 
response 
efficacyi 
(Workman et al., 
2008) 
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statements about yourself and information security threats to your 
organization:” 
  
RE-1. Employee efforts to keep my organization’s information and 
information systems safe from information security threats are effective. 
5.34 1.28 
RE-2. The available measures that can be taken by employees to protect my 
organization’s information and information systems from security violations 
are effective. 
5.37 1.32 
RE-3. The preventive measures available to me to stop people from 
accessing my organization’s information and information systems are 
adequate. 
5.32 1.32 
RE-4. If I perform the preventive measures available to me, my 
organization's information and information systems are less likely to be 
exposed to a security threat. 
5.43 1.46 
Security self-
efficacyi 
(Workman et al., 
2008) 
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statements about yourself and the information security threats to your 
organization:” 
  
SSE-1. For me, taking information security precautions to protect my 
organization’s information and information systems is easy. 
5.38 1.30 
SSE-2. I have the necessary skills to protect my organization’s information 
and information systems from information security violations. 
5.06 1.53 
SSE-3. My skills required to stop information security violations against my 
organization’s information and information systems are adequate. 
5.14 1.46 
SSE-4. I believe that I could learn to perform the preventive measures to 
protect my organization’s information and information systems effectively. 
5.43 1.40 
Response costi 
(Workman et al., 
2008) 
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statements about yourself and information security threats to your 
organization:” 
  
RC-1. The inconvenience of implementing recommended security measures 
to protect my organization’s information and information systems exceeds 
the potential benefits. 
2.89 1.68 
RC-2. The negative impact on my work from recommended security 
measures to protect my organization’s information and information systems 
is greater than the benefits gained from the security measures. 
2.80 1.56 
RC-3. Recommended security measures are so much of a nuisance that I 
think my organization would be better without them. 
2.41 1.55 
RC-5. The negative side effects of recommended security measures in my 
organization are greater than the advantages. 
 
2.62 1.56 
Measures 
(Citations) 
Prompts and Measurement Items Mean Std. 
 
Maladaptive 
rewardsi  
(Posey et al., 
2015a) 
Instructions: “Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statements about information security threats to your organization:” 
NOTE: Rewards in these statements refer to ANY personal rewards that you 
could receive from ANY organization, institution, or individual, including 
yourself. 
  
MR-1. It is likely that I would receive personal rewards for purposefully not 
protecting my organization’s information and information systems from 
security threats. 
1.93 1.52 
MR-2. I could be rewarded personally for not protecting my organization 
from information security threats. 
1.95 1.55 
MR-3. I would receive personal gratification for purposefully not protecting 
my organization from its information security threats. 
1.76 1.39 
MR-4. I would feel a sense of internal satisfaction for allowing information 
security threats to harm my organization. 
1.85 1.51 
MR-5. I could be rewarded financially for choosing not to protect my 
organization’s information and information systems from security threats. 
2.03 1.61 
MR-6. I believe others would be willing to reward me financially for 
intentionally failing to protect my organization’s information and 
information systems from security threats. 
2.19 1.69 
Protection 
motivationi  
(Posey et al., 
2015a) 
Instructions: ”Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statements about information security threats to your organization:” 
  
PM-1. I intend to protect my organization from its information security 
threats.  
5.90 1.26 
PM-2. My intentions to prevent my organization’s information security 
threats from being successful are high.  
5.58 1.53 
PM-3. It is likely that I will engage in activities that protect my 
organization’s information and information systems from security threats.  
5.66 1.52 
PM-4. I intend to expend effort to protect my organization from its 
information security threats.  
5.29 1.79 
Protection-
motivated 
behaviorsiii  
(Posey et al., 
2015a) 
Instructions:”Given the following statements, on what basis did you engage 
in the stated behaviors in the last year?:” 
  
PMB-1. I actively attempted to protect my organization’s information and 
computerized information systems. 
5.00 1.87 
PMB-2. I tried to safeguard my organization’s information and information 
systems from information security threats. 
5.09 1.79 
PMB-3. I took committed action to prevent information security threats to 
my firm’s information and computer systems from being successful. 
4.72 1.95 
PMB-4. I purposefully defended my organization from information security 
threats to its information and computerized information systems. 
4.76 1.93 
PMB-5. I earnestly attempted to keep my organization’s information and 
computer systems from harm produced by information security threats. 
5.12 1.84 
Note: Scaling was as follows: i 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 Strongly agree; ii 1 Not at all to 7 Very large extent; iii 1 
Never to 7 Always
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Appendix B. Supplement on Common-Method Variance 
According to a recent analysis of common-method variance (CMV) detection and correction techniques in IS, 
the most frequent technique has been the unmeasured latent method construct (ULMC) technique. However, that 
technique has serious shortcomings in both detecting and correcting CMV (Chin et al., 2012). The CFA marker-
variable technique, however, has been found to accurately and consistently detect CMV (Richardson et al., 2009) 
and is relatively underused in IS (Chin et al., 2012, p. A2). This method is particularly well suited for CB-SEM 
because, unlike ULMC, it specifies the comparison of free and restrained models in such a way that allows for 
appropriate model identification (Liang et al., 2007; Williams et al., 2010). The CFA marker-variable technique tests 
for CMV, unequal (congeneric) method variance, and bias due to CMV. The analysis essentially compares the fit of 
three competing CFA results that have varying constraints imposed.  
According to methodologists, the unmeasured latent method factor has three advantages: (1) “it does not 
require the researcher to identify and measure the specific factor responsible for the method effects;” (2) it “models 
the effect of the method factor on the measures rather than on the latent constructs they represent;” and (3) it “does 
not require the effects of the method factor on each method to be equal” (Petter et al., 2007, p. 894). It is important 
to note that the CFA marker-variable technique shares these advantages while remaining fully identified. For this 
research, we chose a marker variable that measures attitude toward the color blue. The three items chosen were: (1) I 
prefer blue to other colors, (2) I like the color blue, and (3) I like blue clothes (Cronbach’s α = 0.840.). 
As previous literature describes, to conduct the full test, we ran five CFAs (Richardson et al., 2009; Williams 
et al., 2010): 
1. A totally free model (Figure 4) 
2. A baseline model that restrains the correlations between the substantive items and the marker variable to 
zero and constrains the loadings of the marker items onto the marker variable and the marker-variable error 
terms to the unstandardized results from the totally free model (Figure 5)  
3. A method-C model that is the same as the baseline except that it constrains the factor loadings from the 
marker variable to each substantive item to be equal to one another (Figure 6)  
4. A method-U model that, again, is the same as the method-C model, except that the factor loadings from the 
marker variable to the substantive items are no longer constrained to be equal (Figure 7) 
5. A method-R model that is the same as either C or U (depending on which exhibited better fit), except that 
the correlations among the substantive variables are constrained to the unstandardized correlations from the 
baseline model (Figure 8 and Figure 9) 
 
Figure 2. CFA 1: Totally Free CFA 
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Figure 3. CFA 2: Baseline Model 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. CFA 3: Method-C Model Figure 5. CFA 4: Method-U Model 
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Figure 6. Method-R Model   
(Based on Method-C) 
Figure 7. Method-R Model  
(Based on Method-U) 
 
To test for CMV, we tested the fit of the CFAs modelled above for significant differences. Specifically, we 
tested the following models for significant differences:  
1. We tested the baseline model for significantly different fit from the method-C model. If method-C had 
significantly better fit, it indicated CMV. 
2. We tested the method-C model fit for significantly different fit from the method-U model. If method-U 
had better fit, there was evidence of unequal method effects. 
3. We tested the method-R model fit for significantly different fit from the method-C or method-U model 
(whichever exhibited better fit). If method-R fit worse than method-C or method-U, there was evidence 
of bias due to CMV. 
To assess the implications of CMV in our sample, we included four variables in our marker-variable technique: 
three substantive variables and our marker variable. We included a substantive variable from each appraisal (i.e., 
fear from the threat appraisal and response cost from the coping appraisal) and our dependent variable (PMBs).The 
results of the CFA marker-variable technique indicate that CMV is not an issue for the current study. The results 
appear in Table 8.  
 
Table 4. CFA Marker-Variable Results 
Model Model Fit Model Comparison CFI Result 
Baseline Model Χ2 = 137.604 
d.f. = 107 
 0.994  
Method-C 
Model 
Χ2 = 137.502 
d.f. = 106 
Baseline vs. Method-C 
ΔΧ2 = 0.102; d.f. = 1; (p = 0.749) 
0.994 No CMV detected 
Method-U 
Model 
Χ2 = 128.697 
d.f. = 94 
Method-C vs. Method-U 
ΔΧ2 = 6.805; d.f. = 12 (p = 0.870) 
0.993 No unequal method 
effects detected 
Method-R  
(Base-U) 
Χ2 = 128.723 
d.f. = 97 
Method-U vs. Method-R 
ΔΧ2 = 0.026; d.f. = 3 (p = 0.999) 
0.994 No bias from CMV 
detected 
Method-R 
(Base-C) 
Χ2 = 137.503 
d.f. = 109 
Method-C vs. Method-R 
ΔΧ2 = 0.001; d.f. = 3 (p = 0.999) 
0.995 No bias from CMV 
detected 
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Appendix C. Post Hoc Exploration of PsyCap 
We assessed the level of protection motivation and PMBs for insiders with relatively high and relatively low 
levels of PsyCap (Table 9 and Figure 10).To examine whether higher-PsyCap individuals perform PMBs at a higher 
level than lower-PsyCap insiders, we performed an independent samples t-test in SPSS (v. 22), grouping insiders 
with PsyCap above the median level as higher-PsyCap and those below (inclusive) the median level as lower-
PsyCap. As in our CMV analysis, we included a theoretically unrelated construct to ensure that any differences we 
found for protection motivation and/or PMBs across PsyCap levels were not due to some methodological artifact 
(e.g., groups reporting statistically higher or lower scores in general). Our results (which appear in Table 9 and 
Figure 10) demonstrate that the mean PMB and protection motivation are greater for those insiders with relatively 
high PsyCap and that there was no mean difference across groups for our theoretically unrelated construct.  
 
Table 5. Mean Across PsyCap Levels 
 
Construct Mean t-value (sig.) 
PMBsi 
Lower PsyCap (n = 189) 4.75 
2.117* Higher PsyCap (n = 188) 5.13 
Protection Motivationi 
Lower PsyCap (n = 189) 5.22 
6.381*** Higher PsyCap (n = 188) 6.01 
Blue Scalei 
Lower PsyCap (n = 189) 4.80 1.080 Higher PsyCap (n = 188) 4.94 
i Equal variances assumed (Levene’s test insignificant 
at p = 0.05) 
Median PsyCap level = 5.329 
Figure 8. Differences Across PsyCap Levels 
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